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The rationing problem is common to all health systems––the challenge of managing ﬁnite resources to
address unlimited demand for services. In most low- and middle-income countries, rationing occurs as an
ad hoc, haphazard series of nontransparent choices that reﬂect the competing interests of governments,
donors, and other stakeholders. Yet in a growing number of countries, more explicit processes, with
strengths and limitations, are under development that merit better support. Against this background,
the purpose of the Center for Global Development Working Group, which is to examine how priorities
are set currently, and to propose institutional arrangements that promote country ownership and
improve health outcomes by more systematically managing this complex process of politics and eco-
nomics, is discussed. Current global and national priority-setting practices in low- and middle-income
countries, the potential for strengthened national institutions, and increased global support are
reviewed. Recommendations for action are provided.A fundamental challenge for all health systems is
to allocate finite resources across the unlimited de-
mand for health services. This is a rationing prob-
lem, regardless of whether it is explicitly
addressed as such, because it requires active or pas-
sive choices about what services are provided to
whom, at what time, and at whose expense. Inevi-
tably, some demand goes unmet, which is a source
of the intense pressure to provide more services
within any given resource envelope. Efforts to re-
duce waste, increase quality, and improve efficiency
are all responses to this pressure. Expanding health-
care costs are another reflection of the same forces.
A recent Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) report [1] found that
health spending growth exceeded economic growths have reported that they have no relationships relevant to the co
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Policymakers and analysts working in low- and
middle-income countries (LMIC) are concerned
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ployed technical ‘‘priority-setting’’ approaches to
argue for certain interventions over others. The
burden of disease approach, applied by the World
Health Organization (WHO) using the disabil-
ity-adjusted life year (a standardized measure of
disease burden), has been used to facilitate compar-
isons of one health problem versus another. Cost-
effectiveness analysis is another commonly invoked
technique, for instance as used by the United King-
dom’s Department for International Development
in its ‘‘value for money’’ initiative. In general, these
approaches are intended to maximize the impact
(however defined) of health spending in LMIC,
but because donors and others usually produce their
own analyses using their own methods, there is no
consensus on what should be prioritized.
The result of a myriad of actors championing a
kaleidoscope of ‘‘priorities’’ is confusion. Advocates,
researchers, and policy makers have labeled almost
every disease, condition, medication, or interven-
tion a ‘‘health priority.’’ From rotavirus to cardiovas-
cular disease, from leishmaniasis to cervical cancer,
from vaccines to palliative care, the gamut of health
needs and possible responses are prominent on the
agendas of various groups. Competing advocacy ef-
forts are not new and are likely to remain a key fea-
ture of the landscape. For instance, the recent UN
High-Level Meeting on Non-Communicable Dis-
eases [2] promoted at least 4 new conditions as glo-
bal priorities, without recognizing the difficult
reality that prioritizing some issues also means
deprioritizing others. The problem is particularly
acute for policy makers in many LMIC because they
do not have institutional mechanisms that could as-
sess various proffered ‘‘priorities,’’ evaluate political
and economic constraints, and gather input from a
broad range of stakeholders, including citizens.
In addition, many LMIC depend on external re-
sources to finance their health systems, and many
also rely on donors or other partners for technical
assistance or implementation support. This adds
an international dimension to the already compli-
cated matter of setting priorities because reliance
on external financing and advice leaves countries’
domestic policy processes open to outside influence.
A common outcome is a negotiated set of priorities
that reflect some domestic needs and some techni-
cal, political, and economic considerations defined
largely by the interests of donors. Few would argue
that this process is optimal.
Coping with tradeoffs in the prevention and
treatment of human immunodeficiency virus/ac-quired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS)
is among the most visible global rationing dilem-
mas facing policy makers and donors. Only 36%
of those needing antiretroviral therapy were receiv-
ing treatment in Africa as of December 2009 [3].
Countries must decide who will receive lifesaving
antiretroviral therapy, when, and under what cir-
cumstances. Yet in most cases, countries have not
defined explicit rationing criteria, leading to a non-
transparent process rife with opportunities for
abuse by those with influence and partially or com-
pletely void of ethical considerations [4]. An Insti-
tute of Medicine panel on the future of HIV/AIDS
in Africa [5] acknowledged this problem, calling
for a ‘‘decision-making process for resource alloca-
tion [that] incorporates robust safeguards not only
against discrimination but also against arbitrary or
self-serving exercises of power.’’
Potential conflicts over priorities are already very
complicated within the domestic sphere. For in-
stance, important drivers of costs in middle-income
countries have been rights-based legal arguments
by which citizens have used the court system to
compel the provision of often-expensive therapies.
This strategy has been used in some South Amer-
ican countries where the right to health is en-
shrined in constitutional law. In these instances,
citizens have forced the expansion of state-provided
services, which leads to increased health system
expenditures and/or cuts in other services. This
practice will likely spread; civil society organiza-
tions in Uganda recently sued the government over
2 maternal deaths [6]. Because this strategy only
compels the government to provide specific addi-
tional services, it does not address wider implica-
tions of how much should be spent, how the
resources should be used, or what tradeoffs might
result [7,8].
In many cases, health systems plan to provide far
more services than is possible under their existing
budgets, which creates the difficult problem of
rationing the provision of promised services. Many
plans have no budgets linked to the activities de-
scribed in the plan. Ssengooba [9] illustrates this
quandary in Uganda, where a package of services
costing $28 per capita was expected to be delivered
with an $8 per capita actual expenditure. More
generally, governments in many LMIC tend to
promise universal coverage to all those in need.
For example, the constitution of Haiti states: ‘‘the
state of Haiti has the absolute obligation to guaran-
tee the right to life, health and protection without
distinction’’ [10]. However, financial resources are
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practice. The lack of coherence between a limitless
promise and limited resources leads to implicit
rationing through waiting lines, low quality, ineq-
uities, and other mechanisms.
The multiplicity of priorities and the lack of
institutional mechanisms at global and national
levels to rationalize services and spending often re-
sult in poor overall system performance, as mani-
fested in low coverage levels for highly effective
health technologies, relatively excessive supply of
high-cost services with limited clinical advantages,
inefficient and underused health facilities, inequi-
table access to services, and ultimately poor health
outcomes. Gains from reallocating toward more
cost-effective health interventions can be substan-
tial, illustrating the human and financial costs asso-
ciated with weak and implicit rationing
institutions. For example, a 2011 study by the Cen-
ter for Global Health Research in India [11] esti-
mates that a basic package of cost-effective health
care would cost about one-half of current per capita
public spending on health and reduce total deaths
by 28%. For cardiovascular disease (CVD), Gazi-
ano et al. [12] find that pharmacotherapy can be
cost-effective in low resource settings and that
CVD-related deaths could be reduced by up to
50%. Yet in most countries, the rationing compro-
mises of the current implicit priority setting mech-
anisms are rarely made explicit to policy makers or
the citizens they serve.
In this paper, we begin with the argument that
for any given budget, systematic approaches to pri-
ority setting produce more health services and ulti-
mately better health outcomes than do approaches
that are haphazard or largely ad hoc. The large lit-
erature on priority setting shows widespread sup-
port for this position. However, most
investigators have concentrated only on the techni-
cal aspects of priority setting, such as quantifica-
tions of the burden of disease or the cost-
effectiveness of interventions. Although these tech-
nical contributions constitute key potential inputs
into the process, priority setting is fundamentally
a political exercise, because it involves the distribu-
tion of benefits and responsibilities. As Reich [13]
observed in his critique of the 1993 World Devel-
opment Report (WDR), technical advancements
do not automatically translate into political action.
Our review of the field finds that the process by
which countries move toward more systematic ap-
proaches remains largely unanalyzed. Accordingly,
we focus our attention on institutional mechanismsthat can help manage the politics of decision mak-
ing by providing independent, technically sound
assessments of health priorities and interventions.
We begin by briefly reviewing global efforts to sup-
port more systematic priority setting. We then re-
view national-level institutions that have tried to
increase the influence of technical evidence in pri-
ority-setting decisions. We discuss the evidence
and then identify important decisions and chal-
lenges that arise when establishing and managing
priority-setting institutions. We conclude with rec-
ommendations for how countries can move toward
more systematic priority setting to increase the
effectiveness of their health spending and promote
better lives for their citizens.
GLOBA L E F FOR T S TO SUPPOR T
P R I OR I T Y S E T T I NG
Global-level attempts to support priority setting
have been undertaken for at least 3 decades, but
these efforts have tended to focus on only a few as-
pects of priority setting, such as gathering evidence
or creating methods, and have yet to result in broad
improvements via more systematic decision making
in LMIC. Perhaps the best-known of these pro-
jects has been the World Bank’s 1993 WDR [14]
and related literature, which was inspired by the
Oregon Health Services Commission’s effort to
prioritize within the U.S. Medicaid program in
the late 1980s [15]. This work introduced the glo-
bal health community to the use of cost-effective-
ness criteria to determine which health
interventions would be publicly financed––and by
extension donor-financed. These investigators ar-
gued that burden of disease estimates could be
combined with a cost-effectiveness rank list of
interventions to derive packages of services that
would facilitate the largest improvement in health
as measured by disability-adjusted life years, for
any given budget. Murray et al. [16] distinguished
between calculating these packages from a ‘‘ground
zero’’––where the current budget is applied to the
whole of disease burden in the absence of currently
financed health interventions––versus a ‘‘marginal
expansion’’––wherein a package would be con-
structed with an additional or marginal increase
in budget applied to the current disease burden.
Criticisms of this approach have focused on the
weak data on which estimates of burden, cost, and
effectiveness relied; the value judgments implicit in
disability-adjusted life year age weighting and dis-
counting decisions; and treatment of equity issues
16 Glassman et al.
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with translating a ground zero package into a pub-
lic budget based on historical inputs [18]. Further,
early cost-effectiveness analysis only considered
health maximization as the priority-setting objec-
tive; later work has highlighted the need for multi-
dimensional priority-setting objectives, including
equity and fairness, financial protection, and exist-
ing health system capacity. Beyond these consider-
ations, policy implementation and adoption issues
have not been explored adequately.
Since the 1993 WDR [14], much work has fo-
cused on regularly updating estimates of the global
burden of disease, injuries, and risk factors (1990,
2000–2002, 2004 thus far; 2005 and 2010 projec-
tions underway) via the Disease Control Priorities
Project and a connected WHO/Institute for Health
Metrics and Evaluation collaboration [19]. The
availability of this information has likely played a
role in the increasing number of LMIC-focused
cost-effectiveness studies published in the peer-re-
viewed literature, which now number in the thou-
sands. But their application in practice to actual
priority-setting processes is likely to be very small.
Another growing area of activity relates to mod-
els and tools that policy makers could use to design
their own packages or identify priority interven-
tions. For instance, the 1994 Health Resource
Allocation Model, by Murray et al. [16], is opti-
mized for burden of disease, cost-effectiveness of
available health interventions, and available health
system infrastructure. Other examples include
WHO’s Choosing Interventions that are Cost-
Effective (CHOICE) Project, which incorporates
interactions between concurrent interventions and
models the effect of scale on costs and effectiveness
for every intervention and every combination at dif-
ferent levels of coverage [20,21]. The Lives Saved
Tool [22], developed by Johns Hopkins University,
allows users to compare the health impact of alter-
native coverage strategies over a period of time, but
it does not model costs. The comprehensiveness of
these models is growing. Evidence and Value: Im-
pact on Decision Making (EVIDEM) combines a
multicriteria decision analysis value matrix made
up of 15 quantifiable components of decision (qual-
ity of evidence, disease, intervention, and econom-
ics) with a qualitative tool including 6 ethical and
health system-related components of decision,
and pilots the tool for a single disease in South
Africa and Canada [23]. Baltussen et al. [24] use
multicriteria decision analysis to prioritize inter-
ventions in 7 LMIC, concluding that methodolo-gies like this ‘‘can have far-reaching and
constructive influences on policy formulation.’’
Yet in all cases, the models remain in the literature
or in pilots, and have rarely been deployed to in-
form ongoing policy-making processes.
The international community has also focused
on improving the quality and availability of epide-
miological, demographic, use, cost, and effective-
ness data that feed into burden of disease and
cost-effectiveness estimations, most notably via
the Health Metrics Network [25], the Demo-
graphic and Health Surveys [26], and the Multi-
Indicator Cluster Surveys [27]. Nevertheless, basic
statistics on births, diseases, and deaths remain
problematic [28]. (According to the UN Statistics
Division, only around 20% of African countries
provided complete information on births and
deaths for at least 1 year in the 2003–2007 period
[28].) Furthermore, little funding has gone to
incentivize or support the regular, quality collection
of these data and their use in actual decision mak-
ing. For example, in spite of the importance of
these data for assessing cost-effectiveness, value
for money, and the impact of their investments,
neither the GAVI Alliance nor the Global Fund
for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria require stan-
dardized reporting on total public expenditure on
health, relevant disease epidemiology, and the local
costs of provision as pre-conditions to the receipt of
their funding [29].
Among the few donor-sponsored initiatives to
directly strengthen evidence-based resource alloca-
tion at the country level is the Supporting Indepen-
dent Immunization and Vaccine Advisory
Committees Initiative (SIVAC). SIVAC builds
the capacity of National Immunization Technical
Advisory Groups and, in some cases, provides sup-
port to carry out cost-effectiveness studies in sup-
port of new vaccine introduction or new vaccine
technology [30]. However, the exclusive focus on
vaccination creates its own challenges, as new vac-
cines are not necessarily compared with the appro-
priate counterfactual. For example, vaccines are
frequently compared with a ground-zero situa-
tion––a vaccine versus no intervention––even when
screening and/or treatment can be viable alterna-
tives. Although these efforts could help prioritizing
among vaccines, they do not address prioritization
between vaccines and other options, which severely
limits their usefulness for national priority setting
in health.
Another prioritization effort is the essential
medicines list (EML). Defined as ‘‘those [medi-
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the population’’ and launched in 1977, WHO––
with the help of an international expert committee
made up mainly of clinical pharmacists––creates
lists of medicines ‘‘with due regard to disease prev-
alence, evidence on efficacy and safety, and com-
parative cost-effectiveness’’ to inform purchasing
decisions in the context of national health agendas.
A model list––updated every 2 years based on
applications––is published online and frequently
adopted (though not necessarily funded or pro-
vided) by governments in developing countries.
As of 2011, 156 countries have adopted versions
of the EML [31]. Whereas indicators to track ac-
cess to essential medicines were only established in
2009 and information on funding is not available, a
meta-analysis of 679 published studies (mostly
from Sub-Saharan Africa) of variable design and
quality reviewed medicines used in primary care
in developing countries and found that the share
of all prescribed medicines that are included on
an EML has increased over time [32]. However,
this does not imply availability of all or indeed most
of the medicines listed on the EML. A study in In-
dia looked at 5 essential medicines for children in-
cluded on the EML, finding that 4 of 5 were
actually available in public facilities [33]. Conceptu-
ally, the weaknesses of EML relate to its exclusively
primary care focus when many countries are seeking
international advice on how to handle higher cost
medications provided in hospitals, as well as the lim-
ited linkages between the medicines included on
EML and the benefits, costs, and affordability
implications of actually providing these medicines.
Furthermore, EML have no local processes of
updating or monitoring/evaluation attached. Final-
ly, the EML approach has not been extended to de-
vices, diagnostics, procedures, and other health
interventions of increasing importance in LMIC.
In summary, global efforts to support national
policy making have been limited to specific dis-
eases, conditions, or types of technologies (such
as drugs or vaccines) and have focused on the gen-
eration of global evidence, rather than generating
country-specific data, supporting country decision
making, building national institutions, or facilitat-
ing exchanges and collaboration. Interestingly,
although efforts are global in scope, none of the ac-
tions mentioned directly help global funding agen-
cies set priorities, in spite of a growing number of
new technologies in the context of declining global
health resources and evidence of widespread use of
ineffective or unnecessary services.NAT IONA L E F FOR T S TO SUP POR T
P R I OR I T Y S E T T I NG
We reviewed national-level attempts to make pri-
ority setting more systematic to understand what
initiatives and processes have been taken on coun-
tries’ own initiatives and to see what links there
may be between these actions and some of the
international research and data collection efforts.
We find that national efforts to support explicit
priority setting in health have taken 2 main paths:
health benefits plans or lists (HBP) and health
technology assessment (HTA) agencies. We review
each separately.
Health beneﬁts plans. As discussed, the World
Bank’s 1993 WDR and the WHO’s Commission
on Macroeconomics and Health both recom-
mended a basic package of cost-effective care in
LMIC as a priority-setting mechanism for LMIC.
Table 1 [34–96] shows that this recommendation
was influential; we identify at least 63 LMIC that
have established an explicit positive and/or nega-
tive package, plan, or list of health interventions
to be funded by public resources, insurance, or so-
cial security contributions (Table 1). Although
HBP are sometimes thought to pertain exclusively
to health insurance schemes, HBP are being used
in all kinds of health systems, even those without
purchaser–provider splits, as a means to structure
resource allocation and potentially improve
accountability, equity, enforcement of rights, and
control of spending. In some countries, these ben-
efits packages have become some of the main driv-
ers of public health expenditure and thereby a key
tool for strategic purchasing of health services. In
a review of the 98 World Bank health projects ap-
proved between 2009 and 2011, 31––about one-
third––refer to plans to develop or support a health
benefits package. In addition, HBP have been used
directly by donors in fragile states such as Afghan-
istan, Haiti, and South Sudan to contract with
nongovernmental organizations for direct service
provision. It is likely that the proliferation of
HBP reflects the influence of recommendations
from the 1993 WDR and WHO’s Commission
on Macroeconomics and Health, which both rec-
ommended a basic package of cost-effective care
in LMIC as a priority-setting mechanism for
LMIC. Table 1 shows that this recommendation
was influential.
Drawing on the existing literature, we find that
countries face challenges with HBP, and we sum-
marize the evidence. We note that a systematic
Table 1. LMIC with health beneﬁts plans
World Bank country grouping Number Positive or negative list of health beneﬁts
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 18 Health insurance schemes: Azerbaijan (SAMHI decree 2008) [34]; Bulgaria (NHIF 1998) [35];
Croatia (HZZO) [36]; Estonia (EHIF 2001) [37]; Georgia (SMIC 1996) [38]; Hungary (OEP
1992) [39]; Kyrgyz Republic (MHIF 1996) [40]; Lithuania (NHIF) [41]; Macedonia (HIFM) [42];
Moldova (MHI 2002) [43]; Poland (NFZ 2003) [44]; Romania (NHIF 2002) [45]; Russia (MHIF
1993) [46]; Slovenia (HIIS 1992) [47]
Tax-funded systems: Armenia (SHA 1998) [48]; Kazakhstan (MOH 2005) [49]; Slovak
Republic (MOH) [50]; Tajikistan (MOH 2007) [51]
Latin America and Caribbean 14 Health insurance schemes: Argentina (PMO 1997) [52]; Chile (AUGE) [53]; Colombia (POS
1993)[54]; Dominican Republic (SENASA 2002) [55]; Nicaragua (Listado de Prestaciones
Medicas Quirurgicas de Salud: Ursula Giedion, Personal Communication, February 27,
2012) [56]; Peru (PEAS 2009) [57]; Uruguaya (PIAS 2007) [58]
Tax-funded systems: Argentina (Plan Nacer 2005) [59]; Bolivia (SUMI 2003) [60]; Brazilb [61];
Honduras (IHSS 1995) [62]; Mexico (CAUSES 2001) [63]; Nicaragua (MINSA) [56]
Asia 8 Health insurance schemes: Lao People’s Democratic Republic (HEF 2008) [64]; Philippines
(PhilHealth 2006) [65]; Vietnam (HCFP 2003) [66]
Tax-funded systems: Cambodia (HEF 2000) [67]; China (NRCMS 2003) [68] ; India (NRHM
2005) [69]; Malaysia (MOH) [70]; Thailand (UCS 2001) [71]
Middle East and North Africa 16 Health insurance schemes: Egypt (HIO 1964) [72] Israel (NIII 1995) [73]; Lebanon (CNSS)
[74]; Malta (NHS 1956) [75]; Syria (NHIS 2010) [76]; Tunisia (CNAM 2007) [77]; United Arab
Emirates (Daman 2006) [78]; West Bank and Gaza (GHI) [79]; Yemenc [80]
Tax-funded systems: Bahrain (MOH 1979) [81]; Djibouti (MOH) [82]; Jordan (MOH 1965)
[83]; Morocco (AMO 2005) [84]; Oman (MOH) [85]; Qatar (SCH) [86]; Saudi Arabia (NHS) [87]
Sub-Saharan Africa 9 Health insurance schemes: Ghana (NHIS 2004) [88]; Kenya (NHIF 1998) [89]; Namibia
(NMBFd) [90]; Nigeria (NHIS 1999) [91]; Senegal (CBHI) [92]; South Africa (NHIe) [93];
Tanzania (NHIF 1999) [94]; Uganda (NHIf) [95]
Tax-funded systems: Zambia (MOH 1993) [96]
AMO = Compulsory Health Insurance; AUGE = Regime of Explicit Health Guarantees ; CAUSES = Catalogo Universal de Servicios de Salud; CBHI = Community-based
Health Insurance; CNAM = La Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie de Tunisie; CNSS = National Social Security Fund ; EHIF = Estonian Health Insurance Fund;
GHI = Government Health Insurance ; HCFP = Health Care Pool Fund; HEF = Health Equity Funds; HIFM = Health Insurance Fund of Macedonia; HIIS = Health
Insurance Institute of Slovenia; HIO = Health Insurance Organization; HZZO = Croatian Institute of Health Insurance; IHSS = Instituto Hondureno de Seguridad Social;
LPMQSS = ; MHI = Mandatory Health Insurance ; MHIF = Mandatory Health Insurance Fund (Kyrgyz Republic, Romania); MHIF = Mandatory Health Insurance Funds
(Russia); MINSA = Ministerio de Salud; MOH = Ministry of Health ; NFZ = Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia; NHI = National Health Insurance; NHIF = National Health
Insurance Fund; NHIS = National Health Insurance Scheme; NHS = National Health Service; NIII = National Insurance Institute of Israel; NMBF = National Medical
Beneﬁt Fund; NRCMS = New Rural Cooperative Medical System; NRHM = National Rural Health Mission; OEP = National Health Care Fund/ Országos Egészségbiz-
tosítási Pénztár; PEAS = Plan Esencial de Aseguramiento de Salud; PIAS = Plan Integral de Atención en Salud ; PMO = Compulsory Medical Plan; POS = Plan
Obligatorio de Salud; SCH = Supreme Council of Health; SENASA = Proceso de traspaso al Seguro Nacional de Salud; SHA = State Health Agency; SAMHI = State
Agency on Mandatory Health Insurance; SMIC = State Medical Insurance Company; SUMI = Seguro Universal Materno Infantil; UCS = Universal Coverage Scheme.
a Beneﬁts package was designed with a TA from the World Bank and AIF (U. Giedion and M. Dinarte, January 2012).
b The lists are conditional on Department of Science and Technology (DECIT) evaluation.
c In planning as of 2009.
d In progress.
e Being established in 2012.
f Proposed.
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ment all the characteristics of these efforts. HBP sometimes rely on poor data, no local data, and
no cost information. Ghana’s HBP and its contents,
for example, were legislated before being costed
[97]. HBP in Latin America do not take future
demographic and epidemiological trends into account
[98].
 HBP are not always linked to available resources or
are unaffordable, leading to erosion of health and
financial protection impact, as well as legal (and polit-
ical) challenges. Chile’s Regime of Explicit Health
Guarantees (AUGE) only calculated the total costbut never the additional cost required to provide guar-
anteed benefits [99]. Mexico’s Catalogo Universal de
Servicios de Salud (CAUSES) grew from 91 interven-
tions in 2004 to 266 interventions in 2008, whereas
the capitation payment associated with the package
was only adjusted for inflation [100]. Where HBP
have worked to structure expenditures, they are
accompanied by changes in budgeting, from inputs
to the packages, where input costs are wrapped up
in the packaged interventions as in Colombia and
Mexico. Many high-income countries also have pack-
ages––particularly the insurance systems of Europe,
Australia, and Canada––but these are based on general
major disease category classifications usually accompa-
G L O B A L H E A R T , V O L . 7 , N O . 1 , 2 0 1 2
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Priority-Setting Institutions in Healthnied by more detailed benefits schedules with associ-
ated fees (for example, a price attached to a diagnos-
tic-related group, such as Medicare’s Ambulatory
Payment Classification).
 Lacking data on the costs and effectiveness of existing
health system activities, HBP costs are generally cal-
culated based on the ground-zero assumption, on a
per capita basis rather than incrementally. This is
the case in Chile, Honduras, and Peru [101].
 HBP can be vague, grouped in general categories with
no specificity (Kenya), or grouped by diagnosis rather
than interventions such that anything can be provided
(Peru) [102].
 In some cases, there are no explicit criteria for defin-
ing the content of health plans, or––in some decen-
tralized countries––plans vary by subnational entity
and their financing depends on the wealth of that par-
ticular locality. This is the case in China for various
health insurance programs [Z. Kun, October 2011],
with consequences for care variation and equity. In
countries that split social health insurance from public
sector provision, there may also be multiple packages
of different breadth, height, and depth, also with
implications for equity. Similarly, criteria are often
applied in an erratic, inconsistent way.
 HBP are often conceived as one-off exercises and no
arrangements are in place to update analyses based on
inflation, new information, or technological develop-
ments. Where updates occur and disinvestment deci-
sions are taken, there are few methodological
standards.
 Cost-effectiveness research is generally carried out
and funded separately from the policy-making pro-
cess, and there can be limited relevance to and con-
nection with coverage and reimbursement decisions.
In China, for example, primary and secondary
research in health is funded separately by different
government agencies, which makes it difficult for
decision makers to get well-coordinated evidence that
addresses their own questions [Z. Kun, October
2011].
 HBP are frequently designed by governments or con-
sultants in isolation, often as a part of development
bank programs. The government of Jamaica recently
issued a request for proposals with Inter-American
Development Bank funding that called for the design
of a HBP in 6 months’ time [103]. Colombia is an
example of a HBP designed by technocrats based on
cost-effectiveness, later challenged by a regulatory
body [104]. Chile’s AUGE package of guaranteed
services was also delegated to technical staff at the
Ministry of Health, with little opportunity for stake-
holder or public input or review [105]. The legal con-
testation of health benefits is spreading in Latin
America [Z. Kun, October 2011] and in South Africa
[106,107]. Parliaments are also involved; in Colom-
bia, Congress recently legislated public subsidy for
treatment of rare, orphan diseases without regardfor trade-offs or costs [108]. (Another work estimated
that the cost of treating Fabry disease alone, which
would benefit between 31 and 37 persons was equiv-
alent to affiliating 664,000 additional people in the
subsidized regime of insurance [109].) Conflicts of
interest of those participating in the evaluation of
technologies and the design of HBP are generally
undeclared.
 There is usually insufficient documentation of meth-
ods, processes, and actual decisions. In 2011, the
Inter-American Development Bank [103] reviewed
coverage decisions (decisions per se, criteria for deci-
sions) for 20 high-cost drugs in 4 OECD and 4 Latin
American countries and encountered an almost total
lack of systematic information supporting coverage
decisions in Latin America.
 Finally, the lack of a consultative, transparent, multis-
takeholder process in HBP evidence evaluation,
design, and adjustment is a prominent feature of efforts
in LMIC. This is a troubling pattern given the ethical,
political, and legal issues involved in the priority-set-
ting process. In South Africa in 1999, for example, uni-
versity researchers using evidence-based criteria
designed an essential package of hospital benefits for
medical schemes that was established in regulation
without any alteration and no public debate [110].
Clearly HBP have had a mixed track record, but
their frequency is an expression of a trend toward
more explicit rationing, motivated by growing pop-
ulation demands and related legal, political, fiscal,
and health concerns, as well as increasing emphasis
on results-based financing.
Health technology assessment entities. Another
approach to priority setting has been the establish-
ment of HTA entities to carry out clinical and eco-
nomic evaluation and assessment of new medical
technologies and to guide reimbursement deci-
sions, mainly in middle-income countries such as
Brazil, Czech Republic, Colombia, Croatia, Esto-
nia, Poland, Thailand, and Uruguay [110].
(Whereas LMIC are the focus of this paper, the
working group also examined HTA processes in
European countries. All European countries have
dedicated national HTA agencies that exploit eco-
nomic evidence as part of applications to include
new medicines for public reimbursement. This is
particularly so in the case of innovative products
or in situations in which the manufacturer is seek-
ing a premium price [111]. Evidence used in HTA
includes the safety, efficacy, effectiveness, cost, so-
cial, institutional, legal, and ethical implications of
new technology adoption, although the precise use
and methodology differs from agency to agency
[112,113]. EUnetHTA, a European Commis-
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dardization of the methods for HTA across Eur-
ope, has been fairly successful in raising awareness
and building a series of methodological tools to
support those doing HTA in countries across Eur-
ope. European experience also illustrates that many
HTA bodies involve a wide range of stakeholders
including decision makers, health professionals,
academics, patient representatives, and laypersons
in the process [114,115]. Although agencies in
middle-income countries did not initially connect
HTA to the design of publicly funded benefits
plans or coverage decisions, the transparency and
rigor of the methodologies used to analyze new
technologies have increased the influence of HTA
agencies on the uses of public funding and have ex-
panded the assessment mandate beyond medicines
to devices, diagnostics, procedures, and other
health interventions. For example, although rec-
ommendations are not binding, the National
Health Fund in Poland is obliged to request and
consider recommendations made by the HTA
agency [110] and one of its first tasks was prepara-
tion of a ‘‘basket of guaranteed services.’’ Thailand’s
Health Intervention and Technology Assessment
Program (HITAP) is now formally part of the
team that designs the National Health Security Of-
fice’s ‘‘universal coverage’’ package. In 2007, Korea
made the use of HTA mandatory in decision mak-
ing on drug and healthcare reimbursement under
the Health Insurance Review Agency [116]. In
Brazil, since mid-2011, new health technologies
can only be listed for funding within the public
health system provided their security, efficacy,
and cost-effectiveness have been demonstrated
and assessed by the Comissao Nacional de Incorpo-
racao de Tecnologias. Similarly, the country’s regu-
latory agency National Health Surveillance Agency
(ANVISA) decides prices of new entrant medica-
tions based on comparative effectiveness. In
Colombia, starting in 2012, a HTA institute will
provide recommendations on whether evaluated
technologies should or should not be included in
the benefits package or whether, more generally,
they should be financed with public resources. In
Mexico, HTA was made mandatory ahead of a
coverage decision in 2011 [117].
Although a more systematic assessment of the
impact of each HTA agency is needed, the working
group found that the savings associated with just 2
HITAP HTA-based recommendations––later
adopted by the Ministry of Health leadership––have, in addition to saving lives, far exceeded their
cumulative operating costs to date [118,119].
In spite of their promise, there are a number of
obstacles to the implementation of HTA in LMIC,
similar to those observed in relation to HBP. First,
evidence from Asia, Latin America, and Africa re-
veals a severe shortage of local technical and analyt-
ical research capacities for HTA compared with the
capacities of high-income countries where HTA
has long been used in policy decision making
[120–122]. Second, the reviews of HTA reports
in LMIC found that the majority of the studies
were vulnerable to bias due to the poor quality of
scientific evidence available and deficient reporting
features [123]. This may be explained by an ab-
sence of standard methodological and process
guidelines and limited research infrastructure in
most LMIC [124–127]. Third, where HTA is
not built into coverage decision-making, HTA re-
search is not usually directed toward major health
problems because many HTA studies in LMIC
are funded by international organizations and phar-
maceutical companies [128]. Given resource con-
straints, HTA studies have to be prioritized and
focused on interventions that would assist decisions
targeting major health problems that could subse-
quently have a large impact on population health
and spending. Fourth, political timing is often at
odds with time requirements necessary to conduct
high-quality HTA [124] and supportive institu-
tional infrastructure to take HTA decisions is miss-
ing. Fifth, many studies find that HTA is a new
discipline among health professionals and decision
makers in LMIC and the lack of a clear under-
standing of HTA among these potential users
was identified as a major barrier regarding the use
of HTA in policy and practice [129]. Similarly,
in an article on HTA agencies in Central and East-
ern Europe, Sorenson et al. [130] identify obstacles
to HTA institutionalization as lack of capacity, lack
of data, scoping difficulties, timeliness, and limited
organizational infrastructure linking HTA findings
to decision making and implementation. Finally,
there is an enduring challenge in connecting the
technical assessment work to national policy-mak-
ing and coverage decision processes [131].
As is immediately apparent from the 2 priority-
setting pathways commonly in use in LMIC, HBP
and HTA have much in common, using similar
methods of economic evaluation and criteria for
decision making, though sometimes applied to
technologies and services with different levels of
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instruments in LMIC over the last decade is moti-
vated by a range of factors, among them growing
population demands, increasing financial pressures
(e.g., the IMF has recently established conditional-
ity related to coverage decisions in publicly funded
health care in Romania under the second review of
the Stand-By Arrangement [132]), greater avail-
ability of new and generally higher cost technolo-
gies, persistent inequities in health and coverage,
and––perhaps––maturation in democratic pro-
cesses. Further, HBP and HTA are converging in
middle-income countries, with HTA agencies or
units being used to inform coverage decisions with-
in HBP. HTA and HBP also have common limi-
tations––data, local capacity, lack of legal
frameworks, limited formal institutional structures,
minimal stakeholder involvement, and sometimes
limited connections to coverage decision making.
D I S CU S S I ON
The Working Group on Priority-Setting Institu-
tions for Health sees opportunities to support the
creation, strengthening, and maintenance of sys-
tems in LMIC that inject objective assessment into
decision making on publicly funded health services
and technologies. These systems can and do help
optimize health outcomes by increasing the techni-
cal content of difficult domestic political discus-
sions that are often further complicated by donor
preferences, industry pressures, and other forces.
In general, we found that country efforts to im-
prove priority setting fell into 2 groups. Some
high-capacity countries––all were middle-in-
come––have established robust institutions to sup-
port the priority-setting process. These countries
acted largely on their own initiative. Progress in
other countries tended to mirror the state of glo-
bal-level research, meaning that technical plans
had been developed, but very little progress had
been made on managing the political process that
actually sets priorities.
After examining trends and characteristics in
priority-setting processes and institutions world-
wide and building on the recommendation of Gie-
dion et al. [133] to analyze priority setting as a
multistep process from a systemic perspective, the
working group adopted a ‘‘7 + 7 framework’’ that
describes 7 principles (distilled from the original
15 [134]) and 7 core processes of priority setting
that––if implemented, ideally under an explicit le-
gal and institutional framework––could have thepotential to improve health for any desired level
of health spending, while channeling and manag-
ing political, commercial, advocacy, and donor
interests via a fair process. Without a legal frame-
work for setting up and using HTA, it is difficult
to ensure enforceability or budget. Equally, if the
courts wish to enforce right-to-health legislation,
but have no access to information and process re-
lated to evidence appropriateness and affordability,
decisions will not have intended effects.
Building on the collective experience of entities
currently using HTA to inform decisions, the
working group recommends that HTA system
governance follow 7 principles. It should be ethi-
cally sound, scientifically rigorous, transparent,
consistent, independent from vested interests, con-
testable, and timely and enforceable [133,134].
The set of 7 processes that emerges from the 7
principles is an ‘‘HTA system’’ whose level of data
and methodological complexity could be scaled
according to country or funding agency circum-
stances. In this usage, HTA system does not refer
exclusively to the technical and analytic function
of assessing an individual technology or interven-
tion, but instead to the entire decision-making
process and context, including the legislative, regu-
latory, policy, payment, and reimbursement frame-
work within which evidence is developed and used.
We therefore use a broad definition of HTA devel-
oped by International Network of Agencies for
Health Technology Assessment [135]: ‘‘the sys-
tematic evaluation of properties, effects, and/or im-
pacts of health care technology. It may address the
direct, intended consequences of technologies as
well as their indirect, unintended consequences.
Its main purpose is to inform technology-related
policymaking in health care. HTA is conducted
by interdisciplinary groups using explicit analytical
frameworks drawing from a variety of methods.’’
Additionally, the term HTA system is chosen to
reflect that priority setting involves multiple actors
and processes and is based on inputs provided by
the health systems, the legal framework, and the
social values prevailing in each society, whereas
the process can lead to different types of outputs
such as coverage decisions, guidelines, protocols,
or other evidence-based recommendations. The
specific HTA system emerges from a country’s pri-
ority-setting starting point: designing or adjusting
a health benefits plan; establishing a positive or
negative list; trying to speed cost-effective medical
innovations to patients; deciding whether to fi-
nance a specific new technology or service.
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1. Registration. Registration or marketing
authorization is a first step in the priority-setting
process. Just obtaining regulatory approval in the
country is a first step toward availability and the
possibility of becoming a priority for public or do-
nor spending. Some countries have used the regis-
tration process to proactively speed access to good
value technologies, whereas others have been more
passive, letting the process be initiated by industry
or donors. Increasingly, pharmacoeconomic evi-
dence and clinical data are required for drug appli-
cations [131]. Once a technology is registered in a
country, products diffuse quickly to those with the
ability to pay, creating immediate pressure for a
public-sector coverage decision. Off-license use is
also an issue. Off-license use can be good/necessary
(as in pediatric medicines) or inappropriate (as in
Colombia and the recent decision to use a certain
brand of antiretroviral (ARV) as prophylaxis). Fur-
ther, the potential for synergies between regulators
and payers at the registration stage is large, given
that security and efficacy of analyzed products are
important evaluation dimensions.
2. Scoping. Depending on a country’s starting
point, it will be necessary to identify and select
broadly defined technologies for evaluation. A poor
country may start from a major, underaddressed
burden of disease, such as CVD, and examine pre-
vention and treatment alternatives. In other cases, a
country may start from a costly device for which the
incremental value for money is suspected to be low
that, if funded, would potentially divert public
monies from higher value uses, or a country might
start with new technologies with great potential to
generate health improvements or cost savings. Gi-
ven more limited resources, the scoping exercise is
especially challenging in LMIC where the number
of technologies outside lists or packages will be
large.
3. Cost-effectiveness. An analysis of the cost-
effectiveness (CEA) or value for money of a tech-
nology should be undertaken using widely accepted
methods, tools, and systematic evidence reviews.
This is the area where most global efforts to sup-
port LMIC to date have centered, but they have
not gone far enough to generate and use local data
or to develop local cost-effectiveness thresholds.
CEA should establish a comparative clinical benefit
and an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, ideally
combining local data on costs and use with interna-
tional data on efficacy, thus adapting and translat-
ing international evidence to local circumstances.The identification of the appropriate counterfactual
information should be given particular attention to
avoid the zero-based scenario and to appropriately
reflect the installed capacity of the health system.
In addition, multiple quantitative criteria can be
built into the cost-effectiveness analyses to reflect
both health and nonhealth priorities in a country.
For example, CEA can reflect equity considerations
via differential weighting of different health states
at different ages, a concern for poverty reduction
via incorporation of financial protection criteria,
and different discount rates given the time prefer-
ences of a given society, among others. A prelimin-
ary recommendation to adopt or not adopt is
developed based on CEA using a country-specific
threshold.
4. Budget impact. The budget impact of a preli-
minary recommendation emerging from CEA
should be assessed. Budget impact analysis is a tool
to predict the potential financial impact of the
adoption and diffusion of a technology into a
healthcare system with finite resources. Whereas
CEA addresses the additional health benefits
gained from investments in a technology, such as
the cost per additional disability-adjusted life year
gained, budget impact analysis addresses the
affordability of the technology, for example, the
net annual financial cost of adopting the technol-
ogy for a finite number of years. This is essential
for LMIC that have highly constrained fiscal re-
sources in the health sector, yet is almost never
conducted as part of the introduction of new tech-
nologies. A recent example is the adoption of the
human papillomavirus vaccine by Rwanda [136].
Tools such as the Marginal Budgeting for Bottle-
necks can be adapted for this use [137].
5. Deliberative process. A deliberative process
should be run to examine the results of the CEA/
budget impact analysis, hear from stakeholders,
and consider more subjective decision criteria such
as the severity of conditions, the magnitude of indi-
vidual health gain, the relative rarity of the disease
condition, and trade-offs with ethical implications
[138]. In processes worldwide, an appointed, a
multidisciplinary committee that publicly discloses
conflicts of interest is tasked with making final
technology funding recommendations or decisions.
Payers, providers, experts, industry/manufacturer
representatives, and, sometimes, patient or public
representatives are included in the deliberation,
though voting members may be limited to a subset
of the group. Culyer [139] describes the circum-
stances, common in LMIC, that make the use of
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necessary and relevant:
. . .decisions have been delegated by a body with a
democratic mandate to one without it; evidence from
more than one expert discipline is involved; evidence
from more than one profession is involved; stakehold-
ers have conflicting interests; there are technical dis-
putes to resolve and the evidence may be
scientifically controversial; evidence gathered in one
context is to be applied in another; there are issues
of outcome, benefits, and costs that go beyond the
conventional boundaries of medicine; there is sub-
stantial uncertainty about key values and risks that
needs to be assessed and weighed; there are other
social and personal values not taken into account in
the scientific evidence; there are issues of equity and
fairness; there are issues of implementability and
operational feasibility involving knowledge beyond
that of the decision makers; and wide public and pro-
fessional ‘‘ownership’’ is desired.
Setting up a fair, deliberative process around a technical
recommendation for coverage allows for debate on the
ethical and equitable implications of decisions, such as
who will receive ARV given limited resources, while pro-
viding a space for different interest groups to air concerns
or bring new evidence to the table for consideration.
6. Decisions. Decisions should be guided by the
results of the evidence and recommendations pro-
duced by the cost-effective, budget impact, and
deliberative processes. Recommendations should
be considered by the appropriate authority and
when a coverage decision is made, it should be
linked continuously to public budgets. Though
seemingly self-evident, the HBP, as well as the na-
tional health plan, experience suggests that many
policies and plans remain aspirational and uncon-
nected to budget, or there is a one-time connection
to budgets that can lead to erosion of effectiveness
over time. Even though some advocate specific
technology or program budget line items as the
solution to this issue [140], this approach is ulti-
mately problematic as it is unconnected with indi-
viduals entitled to receive a given intervention or
technology. Depending on the setting, the decision
to fund/cover may be devolved by the payer (insur-
ance fund or government) to the multistakeholder
committee carrying out the interpretation of the
evidence through the deliberative process or it
may remain, at least at the earlier stages of the pro-
cess, the responsibility of the payer at either the
central or local levels. In the latter case, the reasons
for rejecting or deferring a positive or negative rec-
ommendation ought to be made public and be
contestable.7. Appeals, tracking, and evaluation. Finally, a
coverage decision and/or the underlying recom-
mendation and associated analyses should be con-
testable via an appeals process. This can range
from the ‘‘lighter’’ option of a public review that
can be triggered by a select group of stakeholders
to a full-scale appeal, which may include formal
resubmission of evidence and a public hearing. It
is important that the right balance is struck be-
tween offering the opportunity to challenge a deci-
sion publicly, potentially leading to its reversal, and
ensuring the overall process remains timely and
insulated from vested––commercial or profes-
sional––interests that may, as they have access to
relevant resources, be more likely to challenge or
delay unfavorable decisions. Finally, a more elabo-
rate appeals process may be more relevant in set-
tings where legal challenges and perceptions of
procedural weakness have been common to the ex-
tent it may reduce the chances of judicial reviews
and enhance stakeholders’ faith in the decision-
making process.
Decisions are tracked and evaluated, in the pub-
lic domain. The implementation (degree of uptake)
and longer-term impact (in terms of health out-
comes and/or budgetary impact) of decisions need
to be monitored and reported. Uptake evaluation
can drive data collection systems that will in turn
feed into further, better targeted and better in-
formed, updates of the guidance. They can also
form the basis for performance assessment of
purchasers and providers at the local level, through
helping to identify the most appropriate and least
burdensome uptake metrics to be assessed. Finally,
impact assessments can strengthen the case for
using evidence and independent processes to in-
form coverage decisions, including in situations
where additional investment is needed making
the financial case for further investment, which
may become increasingly important for both
global donors and LMIC Ministries of Finance.
A regular assessment of whether the process
needs repeating is also necessary. For example, in
the event of new safety data, the process would re-
start at Step 1, or if new clinical or cost data be-
comes available, the process could restart at Step
3. Regular reviews and updates are critical in ensur-
ing decisions are based on credible processes and
up-to-date information.
There are a number of critical elements of a
robust, sustainable HTA system that do not fit di-
rectly within the processes described. Priority-set-
ting decisions must be made in the context of
Figure 1. Application of the 7 · 7 framework using a real case study from the British NICE and NHS. Reprinted, with permission, from
[141].
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support or undermine the ability to implement
these decisions. For that reason, there is often a
need to design HTA systems that are mindful of
these contextual factors. In some cases, successful
implementations of HTA-driven priority-setting
policies require reconsideration of statutes and reg-
ulations. Furthermore, because of the limited avail-
ability of information about the comparative
effectiveness of many health technologies and ser-
vices, it will also be critical for the evaluation pro-
cesses to be linked to systems for evidence
development to address critical uncertainties in
high-priority domains. Local or regional mecha-
nisms for funding and implementing primary re-
search will need to be organized to address
critical uncertainties that arise in priority setting,
so that the objective of policy making driven by
effectiveness and value can be more consistently
achieved.
The HTA system, whether global or national,
should help to increase the rigor and relevance of
evidence considered, provide a fair and transparent
mechanism to manage the politics around resource
allocation, connect evidence-based decisions to
budgets, and create permanent institutional chan-nels to consider resource allocation choices over
time. The Box [141] describes how the HTA sys-
tem works in the British National Health Service
using the example of secondary prevention of
CVD (Fig. 1).
In Figure 1 and the following explanatory text,
we apply the 7 · 7 framework using a real case
study from the NICE and the British National
Health Service (NHS). Alongside countries such
as Canada, Sweden, New Zealand, and Australia,
Britain has one of the best developed systems of
translating evidence into policy. This need not
mean that the NICE institutional standard is (or
ought to be) the model for other countries. Every
country has to develop its own mechanism for
identifying priorities and acting on them based on
evidence and values. Equally, our choice of example
need not imply that implementing the 7 · 7 frame-
work is unattainable in a LMIC setting. Indeed,
countries such as Thailand, China, and Brazil are
building similar mechanisms. We chose this exam-
ple because it is (perhaps because of the accessibility
of NICE data and decisions and the fact they are in
English) one of the better-documented cases of
applying the 7 · 7 framework to real policy
decisions.
 Secondary prevention of CVD: an example from
the British National Health Service.
In low-income countries, over 75% of people with
coronary heart disease or who had a stroke, did not re-
ceive any of the 4 effective drug types (aspirin, beta-
blockers, angiotensin-converting enzyme [ACE]
inhibitors/angiotensin receptor blockers [ARBs], and
statins for myocardial infarctions; and aspirin, beta-
blockers/diuretics/calcium channel blockers, ACE
inhibitors/ARBs, and statins for stroke). For mid-
dle-income countries, the rates varied from 50% to
over 70%. The use of statins between high- and
low-income countries varied 20-fold, with the sick-
est/highest risk group patients, receiving the least
care. The investigators conclude: ‘‘although some pa-
tients receive appropriate treatments when they access
health-care providers or hospitals, most do not receive
basic effective therapies long term, with many individ-
uals receiving no preventive treatment Prevalence of
drug use was substantially lower in less economically
developed countries than it was in developed coun-
tries, suggesting an urgent need for systematic ap-
proaches to understand and rectify the causes of the
large treatment gap in secondary prevention globally.’’
 Secondary prevention of myocardial infarction
using pharmacological treatment.
1. Registration. The 4 drug classes recommended
for secondary prevention of myocardial infarction
are: ACE inhibitor (or ARB, if intolerant) + aspirin
(or an alternative antiplatelet) + beta-blocker + statin
(unless there is a contraindication or side effects re-
ported). All 4 drug classes have been registered in
Europe with the European Medicines Agency
(EMA) (and/or in the United Kingdom by Medicines
and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency
[MHRA]), and all 4 are currently available in generic
form at a price lower than the branded or branded
generics, with ARBs being the last class to lose patent
(losartan was the first drug in its class to become gen-
eric in March 2010, valsartan followed in 2011, and
candesartan and irbesartan in 2012).
2. Scoping.
a. According to Royal College of General Practi-
tioners and National Collaborating Centre for
Primary Care [149], ‘‘the annual incidence of
myocardial infarction for men aged between
30 and 69 is about 600 per 100,000 and for
women about 200 per 100,000. The British
Heart Foundation (2004) has estimated that
there are about 147,000 MIs per year in men
of all ages in the UK and 121,000 in women,
giving a total of 268,000 cases. In the UK,
about 838,000 men and 394,000 women have
had a myocardial infarction at some point in
their lives.’’
b. Reducing mortality from cardiovascular disease
and secondary prevention of myocardial infarc-
tion (MI) are listed as key national priorities in
the NHS Operating Framework of 2007/2008
[150] and the National Service Framework for
Coronary Heart Disease: Winning the war on
heart disease [151]. These nationally set prior-
ities are important inputs in NICE’s work
program.
3. Cost-effectiveness analysis. Based on published
research [152], the incremental cost of offering
CVD medicines as secondary MI prevention, includ-
ing the cost of the drugs and the visit to the primary
care center, was estimated at £514. The incremental
benefit was estimated at 0.049 quality-adjusted life
years. Therefore, the cost per quality-adjusted life year
was £10,816. Based on sensitivity analysis, pharmaco-
logical secondary prevention is deemed to be cost-
effective even if the overall cost of the intervention
is twice as high as the estimated cost. Furthermore,
the current levels (baseline) of offering secondary pre-
vention at a primary care setting across the United
Kingdom are at 11.3%. With a primary care center
level prevalence of MI of 0.75%, offering monetary
incentives to encourage secondary prevention also
becomes cost-effective.
4. Budget impact analysis. Using prescription and
prevalence data [153] from IMS and the national
Myocardial Infarction Audit Project; tariffs/Diagno-
sis-Related Group (DRG) costs; and unit costs from
the British National Formulary and assumptions on
the likely proportion people on 2, 3, and 4 drug com-
binations as practice changes over 1 year, the addi-
tional annual net budget impact of rolling out
secondary prevention across the country for weighted
drug combinations ranged from £0.3m to £2.1m
(starting from a baseline current cost estimate of
£9.2m). The cost of all four combinations is £195.6
per year per patient. Although the potential savings
from implanting secondary prevention were not quan-
tified, an uncomplicated acute MI costs the NHS
approximately £3,500 and 24 h in the cardiac inten-
sive care unit costs approximately £1,000 per day.
5. Deliberative process. A multidisciplinary commit-
tee [154] of experts and lay people, all of whom abide
by a conflict-of-interest policy, was convened by
NICE as per the published NICE process of opera-
tion [155] to discuss the evidence and make a recom-
mendation as to whether the NHS ought to
incentivize the pharmacological secondary prevention
of MI. In addition to the clinical and economic data,
the committee was presented with results of field-
testing and stakeholder consultation. The minutes of
the discussion and all the evidence was placed on
NICE’s Website. The committee recommended that
a new indicator is included in the NHS’s pay-for-per-
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formance in primary care: ‘‘The percentage of patients
with a history of myocardial infarction (from 1 April
2011) currently treated with an ACE inhibitor (or
ARB if ACE intolerant), aspirin or an alternative
anti-platelet therapy, beta-blocker and statin (unless
a contraindication or side effects are recorded).’’
6. Decisions. The NHS Employers’ organization
and the professional association of British general
practitioners will make the final decision as to whether
pharmacological secondary prevention of MI will
become part of the NHS’s P4P scheme for primary
care doctors across the country. During their annual
negotiations, the 2 parties can choose from a menu
of indicators/activities evaluated and recommended
by NICE’s committees. For 2011/2012, the 2 parties
agreed to include the secondary prevention indicator
in the Pay for Performance (P4P) scheme [156].
7. Appeals, tracking, and evaluations. Compliance
with the P4P guidance (introduced in 2011) on sec-
ondary prevention of MI will be assessed through
annual assessment of data collected through the online
General Practitioners Results Database and primary
care centers rewarded accordingly. In the meantime,
there is evidence of uptake of NICE’s advice on sec-
ondary prevention, with 95.5% of post-MI patients
receiving at least one of the recommended medications
[157]. In addition, data on CVD mortality is regularly
collected through the national audit (Myocardial
Ischaemia National Audit Project [MINAP]) and
overall NHS performance assessed against the 2011/
2012 Outcomes Framework. Finally, cost of prescrib-
ing and percentage of generic prescribing (also incen-
tivized by NICE) for select drug classes such as ACE
inhibitors and statins are monitored by region and
benchmarking data made publicly available through
NHS Prescription Services.
The recommendation and final decision are regu-
larly reviewed as new clinical evidence emerges,
including effectiveness and safety information, and
also as unit costs and utilization volumes may differ
from year to year or new pharmaceutical products are
introduced to the UK market. The clinical guideline
underpinning the recommendation on secondary pre-
vention is currently (2012) being reviewed. The
grounds for the review include: (1) the fact that the
antiplatelet agent clopidogrel has gone off patent in
the United Kingdom and new trial data showing that
ARBs are of similar clinical effectiveness to ACE
inhibitors and (2) combination of the 2 is not clinically
better than monotherapy [158].
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The working group has identified 6 major obstacles
to the further development of HTA systems inLMIC and has developed a series of risk-mitigat-
ing strategies:
Scope is large and unmanageable; demands are
urgent. As noted earlier, many benefits plans are
designed under unreasonable time frames associ-
ated with a window of opportunity for broader
health reform. That initial effort will result in a list
and some notional cost but, to mitigate the risks
associated with this usual practice, efforts could
be made, perhaps as part of the reform legislation,
to ensure that a long-term institution be built,
charged with updating and revising plans, coverage
decisions, or negative lists. As agencies that fre-
quently provide technical assistance and funding
for the development of benefits plans, the multilat-
eral development banks can ensure that institutions
are part of the agenda for policy dialogue.
Further, starting small with a vision for scaling
up is the most practical mitigating strategy. The
Thai, Polish, and Colombian experiences suggest
that initially a small-scale effort will be most feasi-
ble to build confidence on the approach and meth-
odologies, to educate policy makers to create
demand, to train professionals and stakeholders in-
volved in deliberations to prepare/oversee and
understand the evidence, and to address 1 or 2
key health burdens or technologies in an integral
way. The SIVAC and Malaria Vaccine Initiative
(MVI) programs are the seeds of such efforts that
need to be connected with a permanent institu-
tional entity, budget affordability assessments, and
budget decision making. Where the courts or con-
gresses/parliaments have been active in legislating
health priorities, it will be vital to involve these
groups in the designs of the processes and the
small-scale pilots.
Coping with capacity shortfalls. The capacity to
actually carry out clinical and economic evaluations
is a major feasibility concern. However, whereas
capacity to do these evaluations is many times lim-
ited in-country, the entity could call for national–
international partnerships to prepare core evidence
packages or simply contract out to a foreign univer-
sity with expertise (as has been done in Poland in
some cases). In parallel, as has been done in Thai-
land, scholarships and sabbaticals can be arranged
to build more capacity in the medium term. Finally,
capacity building driven by demand and within the
context of a budding HTA system may be the most
efficient way of developing fit-for-purpose human
resources. This is what the Thai model has shown
and is an experience shared by relatively resource-
rich countries such as England where health eco-
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ish National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence’s (NICE) requests for evaluations.
Understanding roles and responsibilities in
fragmented settings. Many countries struggle with
existing priority-setting arrangements that are
fragmented among multiple agencies and individu-
als. A baseline mapping of who does what is
needed in order to build a coordinated priority-set-
ting policy and to understand whether a ‘‘new’’
institution is required and where it should be posi-
tioned or whether the institutional functions
should be assumed by an existing entity. Such an
analysis has been carried out in Colombia during
the preparatory phase of the design of a new health
technology evaluation institute [142].
Can fair processes work in the context of weak
governance and corruption? Given the emphasis
of existing institutions on the role of expert and
stakeholder committees to consider the evidence
and reach a recommendation, there is a worry that
such processes may be illegitimate if subject to
political manipulation or if top leadership does
not support the concept. Some ways to manage
these threats are through: clearly defined proce-
dural rules for engagement, conflict-of-interest dis-
closures, and audits; elections within professional
bodies; and limiting voting rights to government
and committee chairs. The roles of physicians’
organizations have been mixed. Clinical engage-
ment and leadership throughout priority-setting
processes are essential but there is also a need to
ensure that professional and commercial interests
do not capture the process of evidence assessment
and decision making. In many LMIC, for example,
there is a need to distinguish between physician-
led scientific associations and unions focused on
wage negotiations.
However, it is worth noting that priority-set-
ting entities supported by external donors already
exist in many low-income countries. At least 1
priority-setting committee––the Country Coordi-
nating Committee (CCM)––exists in every Global
Fund beneficiary country, including the most
impoverished fragile states. The CCM is charged
with setting priorities in disease control and pre-
vention, consulting with stakeholders, and prepar-
ing the country proposal, including the budget to
the Global Fund. Yet, in spite of adequate fund-
ing and a mandate, the CCMs infrequently use
locally adapted cost-effectiveness and budget im-
pact studies to decide on the optimal mix of tech-
nologies, do not assess whether their budgetsreflect true costs or whether efficiencies can be
made, do not always assess the availability of
new technologies that might be cost-saving or
more effective, sometimes fails to address the
rationing problem directly, and so on. The CCMs
also lack defined processes to carry out their func-
tions. In at least in this context, it seems feasible to
build out the capacity of CCMs to set priorities more
rigorously and in consultation.
In the end, for any HTA/priority-setting activ-
ity to gain traction within a country, there ought to
be a clearly articulated political demand and long-
er-term political backing. Without such backing,
any attempt to rationalize priority setting, build
capacity, and generate data will be unlikely to
succeed.
Intransigent data problems. In low-income set-
tings particularly, there will be very limited data
with which to carry out clinical and economic eval-
uations. Beyond the inevitable suggestion that
more support be given to the production of these
data (and asking for what is needed is a start), in
the interim, countries may need to rely on data
from ‘‘similar’’ countries, efficacy and effectiveness
estimates from studies conducted elsewhere, and
assumptions about cost and use based on small
samples and outdated demographic projections.
Although this will be frustrating, problematic stud-
ies may galvanize greater demand for measure-
ment, and perhaps motivate donors to support
routine, consolidated data collection and disease
surveillance at scale. Alternatively, entities can
commission original data collection. A donor-
funded project in India, for example, is collecting
representative data on costs in primary healthcare
clinics as an input into a more accurate cost-effec-
tiveness estimate and affordability analysis [143].
Weak links to decision making. A final problem
encountered in many HTA systems in high-in-
come countries is the inefficiency with which the
assessment programs are linked to decision mak-
ing. More progress has been made recently, though
for many years, the technical production of HTA
reports received only limited attention in coverage,
benefit, or budgetary decisions. It is possible that a
similar phenomenon could occur in LMIC; in
Malaysia, for example, whereas HTA conducted
within the Ministry of Health on drugs has an im-
pact on listing in the ministry’s formulary, HTA on
devices and practices has no impact on reimburse-
ment decisions [144]. In a study in Latin America,
policy makers identified the lack of a transparent
and clearly defined link between HTA and the
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effective application of HTA to resource allocation
decisions [145]. This risk is mitigated by the more
pronounced fiscal pressures under which LMIC
operate, lessons learned from the high-income
countries, as well as potentially proactive global
support to an integral HTA system.
R E COMMENDAT I ON S
Based on this framing of an HTA system and its
challenges in different settings, the working group
recommends direct, substantive support to the cre-
ation and development of both global and domestic
HTA systems. Within domestic actions, the work-
ing group made a distinction between strategies
relevant to middle-income countries and those rel-
evant to low-income countries.
Global HTA facility. A global HTA facility
should be created to provide sustained technical
and consultative support to global funding agencies
and LMIC governments. Global funders have an
ongoing need for rigorous economic evaluation of
technologies to be funded, from antiretroviral med-
ication to bed nets to determining the best strategy
for funding CVD prevention and multi-drug-resis-
tant tuberculosis control. For example, a compari-
son of least-cost equivalent antiretroviral therapy
with the standard first-line regimens in 43 WHO
‘‘3 by 5’’ focus countries finds that 59% of countries
use drug combination regimens that are more
expensive than available alternatives, demonstrating
the capacity for funders to achieve similar results at
a reduced cost.
A Global HTA facility might also undertake the
accreditation of national HTA systems and evalua-
tions. Building off the working group findings and
recommendations as well as instruments already
developed to assess clinical guidelines [146], stan-
dards for a system could be developed that would
establish the full range of analytic and decision-
making components of a working system. Func-
tional and quality standards might include, among
other things, basic analytic skills sets, defined rela-
tionship to decision-making authorities, transpar-
ency, public engagement, appeals, HTA/
regulatory alignment, appeals mechanisms, basic
analytical methods standards, or a link to research
priorities. Donors such as the Global Fund could
require that accredited HTA systems be in place
and in use as conditions of grants and loans. The
global HTA facility could also track the health
and budget impact of coverage decisions in a selec-tion of countries over time to inform future
reforms.
A global HTA entity could also derive econo-
mies of scale in the generation and adaptation of
evidence dossiers, following toolkits and glossaries
already developed [124]. As new technologies come
online, there is little need for each country to repeat
core analyses, but a great need to appropriately
adapt HTA conducted in other countries to the
epidemiological, cost and utilization profiles
domestically. Recent work on a geographic ‘‘trans-
ferability checklist’’ for HTA will also be useful
[147]. There are also great synergies in the sharing
and benchmarking of coverage decisions among
countries at similar levels of gross domestic product
per capita, a simple strategy that could provide local
decision makers with the ammunition needed to
adopt a new cost-effective technology, to tailor
high-cost interventions to high-need subgroups,
or to say no to inappropriate and expensive inter-
ventions. This approach has been used by the In-
ter-American Development Bank in the context
of a regional project and has been used to inform
coverage decision-making during a 2010 update
of Colombia’s benefits plan [143,151]
Also, international funders, especially interna-
tional organizations such as the World Health
Organization, the World Bank, or multinational
pharmaceutical companies should be well aware
of the difficulties in using HTA conducted in 1 set-
ting for another setting, especially when the studies
involve economic parameters and social prefer-
ences. Because when they commission economic
evaluation studies, they are likely to use economic
evaluations to inform policy decisions in multiple
settings. As a result, they should request the use
of multinational trials for estimating clinical effi-
cacy of the intervention, not only to introduce the
intervention more widely, but also to provide for
the collection of local data used in local HTA.
The support of this facility would be guided by a
deep, current knowledge of the history and best
practices of HTA systems developed in other coun-
tries, applying lessons learned in those situations to
ensure that best practices are replicated and com-
mon mistakes are avoided. Above all, a tailored ap-
proach to technical assistance, with practitioners in
each country relating directly to each other will be
useful and will help protect and enhance the inde-
pendence and status of those charged with carrying
out this very difficult task.
Direct support to LMIC. Direct support to
LMIC that are creating or growing their own
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ing capacity-building efforts via evidence creation,
tools, and methods could be more directly targeted
to government counterparts charged with carrying
out priority-setting work. Further, hands-on tech-
nical pilots and demonstration projects––from the
relevant starting point––would be a way to engage
with policy makers on real-time concerns. Advice
and financial support to generate data on effective-
ness, efficacy, medical practice, and patient use pat-
terns in-country have been highlighted as a priority
in Asia [148].
Coaching via procedural advice and knowledge
exchange among countries, facilitated by a global
facility or a regional network, will also be essential.
Exchanging examples of legislation, process guide-
lines including conflict-of-interest management,
handling of confidential data, stakeholder involve-
ment, and overall governance and oversight can
prevent ‘‘reinventing the wheel.’’ Providing support
to communications and public awareness-raising
can also be useful to build stakeholder support
and demonstrate the commonality of problems
and solutions.
The working group made an important distinc-
tion between low-income and high-income coun-
tries, and the need to develop HTA system
options for low-income settings that would build
on bodies such as National Immunization Techni-cal Advisory Groups and CCM that are in some
cases already setting priorities for public and donor
budgets. Even in countries that only do HBP in
the context of results-based financing or perfor-
mance-based contracting and/or where donors take
a more direct role in priority setting, a version of an
HTA system could be put in place, which would
relieve donors of the difficult technical and ethical
decisions that are taking place implicitly, without
adequate technical justification, and in the absence
of local participation.
Given the global economic outlook and antici-
pated drops in aid, how LMIC spend their own
money will be a main determinant of the size and
pace of health improvement in the future. Helping
countries develop HTA systems that will increase
value for money is a way forward.
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